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Overcoming the insider: reducing employee computer crime through
situational crime prevention
Information security has become increasingly important for organizations, given their dependence on
ICT. Not surprisingly, therefore, the external threats posed by hackers and viruses have received
extensive coverage in the mass media. Yet numerous security surveys also point to the ‘insider’ threat
of employee computer crime. In 2006, for example, the Global Security Survey by Deloitte reports that
28% of respondent organizations encountered considerable internal computer fraud.5. This figure
may not appear high, but the impact of crime perpetrated by insiders can be profound. Donn Parker7
argues that ‘cyber-criminals’ should be considered in terms of their criminal attributes, which include
skills, knowledge, resources, access and motives (SKRAM). It is as a consequence of such attributes,
acquired within the organization, that employers can pose a major threat. Hence, employees use
skills gained through their legitimate work duties for illegitimate gain. A knowledge of security
vulnerabilities can be exploited, utilising resources and access are provided by companies. It may
even be the case that the motive is created by the organization in the form of employee
disgruntlement. These criminal attributes aid offenders in the pursuit of their criminal acts, which in the
extreme can bring down an organization.
In the main, companies have addressed the insider threat through a workforce, which is made aware
of its information security responsibilities and acts accordingly. Thus, security policies and
complementary education and awareness programmes are now commonplace for organizations. That
said, little progress has been made in understanding the insider threat from an offender’s perspective.
As organizations attempt to grapple with the behavior of dishonest employees, criminology potentially
offers a body of knowledge for addressing this problem. It is suggested that Situational Crime
Prevention (SCP), a relative newcomer to criminology, can help enhance initiatives aimed at
addressing the insider threat.
In this article, we discuss how recent criminological developments that focus on the criminal act,
represent a departure from traditional criminology, which examines the causes of criminality. As part
of these recent developments we discuss SCP. After defining this approach, we illustrate how it can
inform and enhance information security practices.
In recent years, a number of criminologists have criticised their discipline for assuming that the task of
explaining the causes of criminality is the same as explaining the criminal act. Simply to explain how
people develop a criminal disposition is only half the equation. What is also required is an explanation
of how crimes are perpetrated. Criminological approaches, which focus on the criminal act, would
appear to offer more to information security practitioners than their dispositional counterparts.
Accordingly, the SCP approach can offer additional tools for practitioners in their fight against insider
computer crime.
SCP Defined
SCP embodies the implementation of opportunity reducing techniques that target specific forms of
crime; impact on the immediate environment via its design, management, or manipulation; and aim to
either increase the effort and risks of crime, or to render crime less rewarding or excusable, or to
reduce provocative phenomena in the immediate context.4 A number of points derive from this
definition. As mentioned, SCP’s focus is crime specific. Rather than discussing crime prevention at
the level of, for example ‘burglary’ or ‘robbery’, greater emphasis is placed on those specific crimes
which fall into these broader categories. Consequently, preventive measures must be tailored to these
specific crimes. For example, the preventive measures for tackling the burglary of domestic electronic
goods, differ from those required to prevent the burglary of household cash or jewellery.
The definition of SCP further notes how, in a bid to disrupt the commission of specific crimes,
safeguards are introduced into the immediate environment. Such actions are designed to impact on
the offender’s perceptions of the potential costs and benefits of crime commission. The decision to
commence and pursue the commission of a criminal act would be based on the offender’s favourable
evaluation of the situation. The obvious goal, therefore, of those individuals who apply SCP
techniques, is to implement safeguards to the point where the of-fender views certain crimes in an
unfavourable light.
SCP also recognises how as part of the criminal decision making process, offenders consider the
associated moral costs. However, in a bid to nullify any feelings of guilt associated with a crime,
offenders may try to negate such feelings through the construction of excuses such as “everybody
else does it,” “they deserve it.” Attempts, therefore, to stop offenders using such methods may at
times prove a useful preventive safeguard. Finally, SCP theorists have further acknowledged how the
immediate environment may not only afford potential opportunities, but also help in provoking criminal
behavior. Therefore, a number of techniques have been developed to mitigate such phenomena.
In attempting to reduce the opportunities for crime, a pivotal role is played, not as might be expected,
by the criminal justice system, but by a plethora of public and private agencies, including
manufacturing businesses, schools, local parks, entertainment facilities, hospitals, public houses,
shopping centres, and the like. Hence, many cases can now be cited where preventive measures
have been successfully implemented. One such example includes the use of measures designed to
reduce convenience store robbery. In a bid to address this problem, a series of studies in the U.S.
examined the environmental influences which could help to mitigate this type of crime.6 From these
studies, it emerged that a number of measures could be introduced into the immediate context as an
aid to prevention. These included ensuring two or more clerks are on duty (especially during the night
shifts); good cash handling methods (such as limiting the amount of money on store, utilising time-
release safes) and improving exterior visibility (involving the removal of obstructions which inhibit the
ability to look into or out of the store).
With specific regard to the techniques advanced by SCP, these have developed in line with the
evolution of the approach itself. Hence an original 8 were succeeded by 12, then 16, to the position
whereby 25 techniques are currently proposed. Associated with the 25 techniques (see Table 1)4 are
five major aims – increase the effort, increase the risks, reduce the rewards, reduce provocation,
remove excuses and under each of the aims are listed five techniques for opportunity reduction.
Included in Table 1 are two types of examples. Examples from the traditional SCP application areas
are cited in bold. Examples of the techniques with regard to information security are cited in italics. In
terms of the emboldened techniques, examples include target hardening (such as anti-robbery
screens in banks and post offices to increase the effort), strengthening formal surveillance (such as
security guards to increase the risks), removing targets (such as removable car radios to reduce the
rewards), avoiding disputes (such as reduce crowding in public houses to reduce provocations) and
the setting of rules (such as harassment codes to re-move excuses).
Table 1: Twenty–five Techniques of situational prevention
Increase The Effort Increase The Risks Reduce The Rewards Reduce Provocation Remove Excuses
1. Target harden:
 Anti-robbery screens
 Physical locks for pcs
6. Extend guardianship:
 “Cocoon”
neighbourhood watch
 Staff chaperoning of
visitors
11. Conceal targets:
 Gender-neutral
phone directories
 Minimise ID of offices
16. Reduce frustrations
and stress:
 Efficient queues and
polite service
21. Set rules:
 Harassment codes
 Information security
policies
2. Control access to
facilities:
 Entry phones
 Swipe cards for office
acc
7. Assist natural
surveillance:
 Improved street lighting
 Open plan offices
12. Remove targets:
 Removable car radios
 Clear desk and
computer screens
17. Avoid disputes:
 Reduce crowding in
pubs
22. Post instructions:
 “No Parking”
3. Screen exits:
 Export documents
 Reception desks
8. Reduce anonymity:
 taxi driver ids
 ID tags for staff
13. Identify property:
 Cattle branding
 Property marking
18. Reduce emotional
arousal:
Controls on violent
pornography
23. Alert conscience:
 Roadside speed
display boards
4. Deflect offenders:
 Street closures
 Segregation of duties
9. Utilize place managers:
 Two clerks for
convenience stores
 Management supervision
14. Disrupt markets:
 Monitor pawn shops
19. Neutralise peer
pressure:
 Disperse troublemakers
at school
24. Assist compliance:
 Easy library checkout
 Security education for
staff
5. Control tools/weapons:
 Disabling stolen cell
Phones
 Deletion of access rights
for ex-employees
10. Strengthen
formal
surveillance:
 Security guards
 Intrusion detection
systems
15. Deny benefits:
 Ink merchandise tags
 Encryption
20. Discourage imitation:
 Censor details of
modus operandi
 Prompt software patching
25. Control drugs and
alcohol:
 Alcohol-free events
Table 2: universal script example
SCENE FUNCTION SCRIPT ACTION
Preparation Deliberately gaining access to the organization
Entry Already authorised as employee
Pre-Condition Wait for employees absence from offices.
Instrumental pre-Condition Access colleagues computers
Instrumental initiation Access programmes
Instrumental actualization False customer account construction
Doing Authorisation of fictitious invoices
Post Condition Exit programmes and systems
Exit Leave offices
Applying situational crime prevention to information security
From an information security perspective, the 25 techniques can potentially be used by practitioners,
when considering safeguard options for influencing the offender’s decision making process. Indeed,
many of the techniques advanced by SCP are already implicitly used by practitioners. As noted, in
Table 1 are examples (in italics) from the information security field. Examples include controlling
access to facilities (such as swipe cards for office access to increase the effort), extending
guardianship (such as staff chaperoning of visitors to increase the risks), denying benefits (such as
clear desk and computer screens for reducing rewards), and setting rules (such as information
security policies to remove excuses).
One advantage that SCP has over existing information security approaches is that the former focuses
on crime from the offender’s perspective. Considerable crime prevention experience plus input from
fields such as sociology and psychology, has led to the development of the 25 techniques. As
illustrated in Table 1, some of the boxes currently contain no information security examples. They
therefore offer potentially fruitful areas for safeguard innovation and exploitation. For example,
whether or not it is feasible to develop safeguards that “reduce frustrations and stress” and “avoid
disputes,” remains to be seen, but at least the techniques offer a systematic basis for this
consideration.
To continue with the subject of safe-guards, information security practitioners face the perennial
problem of deciding which controls should be selected for addressing certain risks. Yet this is also a
potential stumbling block for crime prevention practitioners, who may have identified the particular
crime which needs addressing but are unsure about which controls to use. In response, this group of
practitioners have used crime ‘scripts.’ These scripts enhance an understanding of the perpetration of
crime. More specifically, any crime is made up of a series of stages. Crime scripts enable the analysis
of offender behavior at each of these stages and with regard to the context in which such behavior
takes place. Hence a clearer understanding of offender behavior affords a clearer understanding of
which safeguards to implement. The scripts approach has already been used to analyse a number of
different crimes, including public transport offences, body switching (the stealing of motor vehicles for
resale purposes) and cheque fraud.
For information security purposes, the development of organization specific scripts could potentially
be based on input from security practitioners and other relevant parties such as departmental staff. To
assist in their development the use of what is termed a ‘universal script’ has been proposed.2,8,9 In
essence, this form of script provides a framework that helps to distinguish between the script’s stages
and, subsequently, the corresponding criminal actions. Table 2 displays the universal script
framework, and an illustrative example of computer crime. The example is taken from the 1998 U.K.
Audit Report entitled Ghost in the Machine: An Analysis of IT Fraud and Abuse. A dishonest local
council employee was able to commit computer input fraud by using an invoice system. Although
there was a technical segregation – different employees had different access to parts of the system
via their PCs – security vulnerabilities were created due to the fact that the offender’s colleagues
failed to lock-down their computers. Waiting until all the staff had vacated the office, the dishonest
employee would then access all the PCs in order to process the fraud. Hence, in the first column of
Table 2, under the heading Scene Function are cited the different elements of the script. Each
element can be seen as a different stage in the commission process and, could, therefore, guide
practitioners in identifying the corresponding criminal behavior, which is listed in Table 2 under the
heading Script Action.
As the name suggests, the first element of the universal script concerns any ‘Preparation’ undertaken
by the offender. In this instance, it is assumed that the corresponding script action involved
deliberately gaining access to the organization. As a consequence, this meant that the proceeding
‘Entry’ stage in the universal script was achieved by the employee who was ‘Already Authorized’ in
terms of access to the work environment. Once ‘Entry’ is achieved, ‘Precondition’ relates to the
circumstances that are required prior to the actual criminal act. In the computer crime example, this
involved the offender ‘Waiting for employees’ absence from offices.’ The next three scene functions
relate to the actual perpetration of the criminal act and are required to allow the main action of the
script i.e. the authorization of fictitious invoices in the ‘Doing’ stage. Hence, be-fore this is achieved,
there must be an ‘Instrumental Precondition’ (‘Access colleagues’ computers’), ‘Instrumental Initiation’
(‘Access programmes’) and ‘Instrumental Actualization’ (‘False customer account construction’). As
noted, once these stages are achieved, the ‘Doing’ stage (‘Authorization of fictitious invoices’) can
occur. After this, ‘Post Condition’ relates to exiting the programmes and system, which in turn allows
for offender to ‘Exit’ by leaving the offices.
Scene Function Script Action Increase The Effort Increase The Risks Reduce The
Rewards
Reduce
Provocation
Remove Excuses
Preparation Deliberately
gaining access to
organisation
Prospective
employment
screening (4)
Entry Already authorised
as employee
—
Pre-condition Wait for employees
absence from offices
Physical segregation
of duties (4)
staggered breaks (4)
Signing in/out of
offices (8)
Instrumental pre-
condition
Access colleagues
computers
System time outs (2)
Biometric fingerprint
authentication (2)
Information security
polices (21)
security education
(24)
Instrumental
initiation
Access programmes Password use for
access to specific
programmes (2)
Instrumental
actualization
False customer
account construction
Two person sign-off
on new accounts (9)
Doing Authorisation of
fictitious invoices
Audit of computer
logs (8) Budget
monitoring (8)
Post Condition Exit programmes —
Exit Exit system User event viewer (8)
Doing later Spend the
transferred money
One benefit of developing a script is that it encourages practitioners to consider all the stages of crime
commission. In this way, all the criminal behavior in the process can feasibly be identified. Once this
is achieved the next goal is to implement the appropriate controls.
To improve the selection of safeguards, crime scripts can be merged with the 25 SCP techniques.8
Table 3 provides an example of such a merging based on the example of computer crime cited earlier
and illustrated in Table 2. The selection of safeguards is improved as the behavior of the offender has
been identified through the development of a crime script. Therefore, a clearer understanding of
offender behavior will lead to the identification of appropriate controls aimed at its prevention. In
addition, with scripts helping to identify all the stages of the com-mission process and the
corresponding criminal actions, this further helps to ensure the optimum use of safeguards. The
numbers cited next to each control refer to the type of SCP technique (see Table 1). Not all the
techniques cited in Table 1 are incorporated in Table 3, but this is to be expected given that differ-ent
crimes will require different controls for their prevention. However, the merging of the techniques,
together with crime scripts, provides a systematic schema for practitioners.
Scripts also allow consideration of the interrelationship between the security behavior of staff,
safeguards, and the criminal behavior of dishonest employees. As employees now play a central role
in enforcing security, appreciating the interplay between their behavior and controls is of paramount
importance. Password systems are a good example of how poor security behavior (such as, writing
passwords down, sharing them with colleagues) of employees can invalidate any protection that such
systems were designed to offer. The example of computer input fraud discussed earlier also
illustrates how – even though the technical segregation of the system was working properly - the
behavior of fellow members of staff left the system vulnerable and open to fraud by the rogue
employee. By considering the criminal behavior at each scene, the requisite controls, and the security
actions of staff, practitioners can consider more clearly their security options. One option, for example,
may be to consider the intro-duction of redundant controls, which come into play when the original
safe-guard, for whatever reason, does not work properly. For example, the ‘Instrumental Pre-
condition’ for the fraud involved accessing colleagues’ computers. Here, staff members created
vulnerabilities by failing to lock down their computers. Practitioners might therefore consider
introducing the ‘redundant’ control of system time-outs.
Another advantage offered by crime scripts concerns the consideration of the criminal attributes
required by offenders for perpetration.8 As noted, Parker7 argues the need to consider cyber-
criminals in terms of their skill, knowledge, resources, access and motives. This, however, leads to
the question of how should this be achieved? Scripts offer a solution to this problem as they are able
to place the offender in the criminal context. This is important as it is the context which largely dictates
and defines criminal attributes.
Criminologists who advocate the use of SCP techniques refer to these attributes as ‘choice-
structuring properties’.3 By this they mean those features of criminal activity which make such activity
not only available, but also attractive to the offender. In the case of computer crime previously
discussed, the rogue employee perceived criminal activity as available given his daily workings with
the invoicing system and the skills and knowledge that had been acquired as a consequence. These
skills and knowledge were complemented by the fact that the offender was aware of the vulnerability
created by his col-leagues failing to lock down their PC’s. Therefore, practitioners could feasibly
identify the choice-structuring proper-ties through the creation of scripts and their ability to afford
consideration of the offender in the criminal context. One source of prevention might therefore stem
from scrutinising the choice- structuring properties and examining methods which deny access to
them. In this sense certain criminal activity would be less available and attractive to potential
offenders.
Conclusion
While there is an obvious need for organizations to address external security threats, the problems
posed by insider computer crime should not be underestimated. Unfortunately, current research and
practice lack a clear understanding of how such crimes are actually perpetrated. In order to obtain
such an understanding we argue strongly for the need to view computer crime from a criminological
perspective. Common to every crime is the role of the offender and with recent developments in
criminology, there are not only explanations as to the causes of criminality, but also how crime is
committed. We have shown how SCP can provide insights and tools for understanding and
addressing the insider threat. This criminological approach is but one of a number which examine the
criminal act and provide explanations and practical knowledge about crime prevention. However,
unless researchers and practitioners recognise the potential for viewing computer crime from a
criminological perspective, this knowledge cannot be exploited and the benefits will be lost.
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